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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
JOE HEASTON and H. R. ELLIS, a
partnership, d/b/a Heaston Ellis
Motor Company,
Plaintiffs, (Respondents)

No. 8228

VS.

MANUEL MARTINEZ,
Defendant (Appel! ant)

JACK LAYTON and MARIAN LAYTON, a partnership, d/b/a Denver
Auto Auction,
Plaintiffs, (Respondents)

No. 8238

vs.
KAY CLARK,

Defendant (Appellant)

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The written opinion of the court in this case is persuasive
and reaches a desirable result from the standpoint of the
Defendants and Appellants, citizens of the State of Utah. Since
the opinion is not law until petition for rehearing has been

3
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acted upon, Plaintiffs respectfully submit an analysis of the
opinion together with their reasons for regarding the decision
as contrary to good law and the rights of and against
the interest of other Utah citizens and the commerce of automobiles in the State of Utah.
The opinion proceeds upon three conclusions:
1. That the Plaintiffs are estopped to assert their rights to

the automobiles for which these replevin actions were instituted
without discussing the law of estoppel.
2. Title 41-1-65 exempts the automobiles in question from

being registered.
3. That Bruce, the licensed used car dealer of Utah had
indecia of title of the automobiles involved.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT
THEIR RIGHTS TO THE AUTOMOBILES FOR WHICH
THESE REPLEVIN ACTIONS WERE INSTITUTED WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL.

POINT II
TITLE 41-1-65 EXEMPTS THE AUTOMOBILES IN
QUESTION FROM BEING REGISTERED.
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
BRUCE, THE LICENSED USED CAR DEALER OF
UTAH, HAD INDECIA OF TITLE OF THE AUTOMOBILES INVOLVED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT
THEIR RIGHTS TO THE AUTOMOBILES FOR WHICH
THESE REPLEVIN ACTIONS WERE INSTITUTED WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL.

POINT II
TITLE 41-1-65 EXEMPTS THE AUTOMOBILES IN
QUESTION FROM BEING REGISTERED.
The above two points are so interconnected in the Court's
opinion that they are discussed here together.
The opinion of the Court in these two cases is based upon
the conclusion that the Plaintiffs in these actions are estopped
to assert their rights to the two automobiles involved. In arriving at that conclusion the Court decided that the Buick
and Pontiac automobiles were not subject to the automobile
registration statutes of the State of Utah.
To the first proposition, the Respondent and Petitioner
would like to call the Court's attention to the fact that the

5
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Court failed to consider the facts of the cases under consideration in the light of the general law and cases on estoppel.
Estoppel is defined by American Jurisprudence, Volume
19, Page 634, Section 34 as follows:
·· . . . Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the
principal by which a party who knows or should know
the truth is absolutely precluded, both at law and in
equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of,
any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably
ignorant of the true facts and who had a right to rely
upon such words or conduct, to believe and act upon
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way that he
would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion
were allowed.''
The general principals and grounds of estoppel are set
out in Page 642 at Section 42 which reads as follows:
" ... The essential elements of an equitable estoppel
as related to the party estopped are: ( 1) Conduct
which amounts to a false representation or concealment
of material facts, or at least, which is calculated to
convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than,
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation,
that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party;
( 3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.
As related to the party claiming the estoppel, they are:
( 1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge
of the truth as to the facts in question; ( 2) reliance
upon the conduct of the party estopped; and ( 3) action
based thereon of such a character as to change his
position prejudicially." (Italics added.)

6
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In American Jurisprudence, Section 43, it is further stated
that the law to be as follows:
"43. Certainty.-Estoppels must be certain to every
intent and are not to be taken or sustained by mere
argument or doubtful inference. No party ought to be
precluded from making out his case according to its
truth unless by force or some positive principle of law.
Hence, the doctrine of estoppel in pais must be applied
strictly and should not be enforced unless substantiated
in every paritcular. The acts, claims, or conduct relied
on to estop must be plainly inconsistent with the right
afterward set up and must clearly appear to have been
done or made by the party whom it is sought to bind.
Where, however, the words or acts of a party are
clearly shown, he may be concluded not only by the
words or acts themselves, but by natural and reasonable
inferences therefrom." (Italics added.)
In Words and Phrases, Volume 15, Page 613-614, in a
statement supported by a long line of cases cited thereunder, it
is stated that the essential elements are as follows:
" ... To constitute an estoppel, the following elements are essential: ( 1) There must be conduct, acts,
language or silence amounting to a representation or a
concealment of material facts. (2) These facts must
be known to the party estopped at the time of his said
conduct, or, at least the circumstances must be such
that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him.
( 3) The truth concerning these facts must be unknown
to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel
at the time when such conduct was done, and at the
time when it was acted upon by him. ( 4) The conduct
must be done with the intention, or at least, with the
expectation, that it will be acted upon /;y the other
party, or under such circumstances that it is both Jta!ltl'ct!
cmd probable that it will be so acted upon. ( 5) The
7
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conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and,
thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. ( 6) He
must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change
his position for the worse." (Italics added.)
In all of these text statements and the cases cited in
support thereof, it is held that one of the essential elements to
support an estoppel is that conduct of the party to be estopped
must be done with the intention or at least with the expectation
that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such
circumstances that it is both natural and possible that it will
be so acted upon. With that particular element in mind, the
Petitioner would like to review the facts in these cases and
the law of the cases cited by the Court to support the proposition that the Plaintiffs are estopped to maintain these actions.
The sole basis for estoppel on the part of the Plaintiffs
as set out by the Court and as contended for by the Appellants
is the fact that the Plaintiffs, who are wholesale automobile
dealers out of the State of Utah, delivered possession of the
automobiles in question to one, Bruce, a licensed Utah Used
Car Dealer who, contrary to the agreement with the Plaintiffs,
placed the automobiles on his lot in Salt Lake City where
they were sold to the Defendants.
There is no dispute as to the actual facts. The only dispute is the interpretation of them in the light of the cases.
Bruce had no bill of sale, no certificate of registration, no
contract of sale, he had nothing but bare naked possession
and with that possession only he placed the automobiles on
his Used Car Lot.
This Court has in effect, by juricial fiat, ruled that the
8
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British Law of "market overt" is the law in this State without
the benefit ofany legislative act. For a brief history of this law
see American Jurisprudence, Volume 46, Page 625, Seeton 462.
The reason such a holding should not be applied was
called to the Court's attention in the Respondents' brief in
Case No. 8238. See Williston on Sales, Sections 313, 314,
315, 316 and 320. Also Blashfield, Volume 7, Section 4357 and
American Jurisprudence, Volume 46, Page 620, Section 458.
As between the parties to this litigation the doctrine of
Caveat Emptor is more just and applicable. The Petitioner
withheld any evidence by which the used car dealer could make
a warranty. The Defendants at the time they dealt with the
used car dealer could have demanded and impliedly by law
did receive a warranty of title for their protection. However,
the Plaintiffs did not give the seller any evidence by which he
could honestly make such a warranty, so that the buyers failed
in their duty to "beware" to ascertain the facts: failing to do
so caused their damage.
In order to determine whether the elements of estoppel
are present in this case, it is necessary to refer back to the
state of mind of the Plaintiffs' or their intentions at the time
of their delivery of the automobiles in question to Bruce, and
in reviewing the facts to make that determination we find the
following:
First a transaction, common m the automobile industry,
that is the sale by a wholesaler to a dealer in the manner described in the Stipulation of Facts set out in the original briefs
covering these two transactions; that is the delivery of posses9
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sion of the vehicles in question and the retention of the Certificates of Title by the seller until the automobiles were paid
for. This was done with the complete assurance on the part
of the Plaintiffs that Bruce could not sell the automobiles and
transfer title without the Certificate of Title.
The question is raised why should the Plaintiffs have such
an idea or thought. The answer might simply be that any normal
persons knows that in the automobile world a Certificate of
Title is necessary to acquire title to an automobile so that any
person with common sense knew that when the purchaser
bought an automobile from Bruce or any other dealer the
vendor would have to deliver to the buyer a Certificate of
Title; thus in order to do this the vendor would have to have
a Certificate of Title. With this thought in mind, the Plaintiffs
would naturally think that by retaining the Certificate of Title
no one would buy the car without obtaining such a Certificate
or in any event the dealer would not sell the automobile without
having such a Certificate especially in view of the agreement
between Bruce and the Plaintiffs that he would not sell or
offer these cars for sale until he had acquired the Certificate
of Title.
The Plaintiffs also are charged with and we can assume
knew and understood the following provisions of the Utah
Code governing the registration and licensing of automobiles.
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 18 reads as follows:
"41-1-18. Registration and certificates of title-Unlawful to violate provisions requiring.-It shall be
unlawful for any person to drive or move or for an
owner knowingly to permit to be driven or moved upon
10
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any highway any vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder which is not registered or for which
a certificate of title has not been issued or applied for,
or for which the appropriate fee has not been paid
when and as required hereunder, except that when
application accompanied by proper fee has been made
for registration and certificate of title for a vehicle it
may be operated temporarily pending complete registration upon displaying a temporary permit duly verified, or other evidence of such application, or otherwise under rules and regulations promulgated by the
commission.''
The following sections governing registration of vehicles
were also in force which the Plaintiffs could rely upon, that
is, Sections 41-1-19, 41-1-20, 41-1-24, 41-1-31, 41-1-35 and
41-1-40.
The Plaintiffs also knew and were charged with and had
a right to rely upon the following sections of the Statutes governing transfer of title or interest. Sections 41-1-64, 41-1-65,
41-1-66, 41-1-72, and 41-1-76.
The Plaintiffs also knew that the Statutes provided the
following: Section 41-3-2:
"41-3-2. Certificate of title to vendee-Every person,
firm, or corporation upon the sale and delivery of any
used or second hand motor vehicle shall within fortyeight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endorsed
according to law, a certificate of title, issued for said
vehicle by the State tax commission."
Also Section 41-3·-23, Sub-section (b):
"41-3-23. Prohibited acts or omissions-Violation
by licensee. It shall be unlawful and a violation of this
11
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act for the holder of any license issued under the terms
and provisions hereof:
(b) To violate any of the terms and provisions of
this act or any of the rules and regulations promulgated
by the administrator under the authority herein conferred upon him."
It is submitted, therefore, that with the above knowledge
of the importance of the Registration Statutes, the Plaintiffs' intentions and expectations would naturally be that the law would
be complied with. That is the natural and reasonable conclusion and if a person reaches that conclusion can it be logically
said that the Plaintiffs' conduct was done with the intention
or at least with the expectation that it would be acted upon
by the other party or under such circumstances that is both
natural and probable that it will be so acted upon as was done
in the case before the court? In other words knowing the provisions of the Statutes, knowing the common understanding
that the Title Certificate goes with each and every automobile, a fact known by all individuals, is it natural to assume that the Plaintiffs when they delivered possession of
these automobiles to Bruce thought that persons would buy
them without any thought as to Title or any inquiry as to
the Title; or is it natural to assume that they thought or had
reason to believe that Bruce would proceed to sell these cars
without first obtaining the Certificates of Title? The answer
to that is no.
In order to support the conclusion of the Court in the
present opinion it is necessary to infer, without proof, that
Plaintiffs did not know the laws of Utah concerning registration of title, and ( 2) that it must be inferred that the Plaintiffs
12
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knew or had reason to believe that the used car dealer would
engage in unlawful sale and ( 3) it must be further inferred
that the Plaintiffs knew that the Defendants would not inquire
as to seller's title and ( 4) it must be inferred that the Plaintiffs
knew or should have known that the Defendants would not act
as a prudent person. All of these inferences must be found
against the Plaintiffs without a fact to support them before
estoppel can be legally imposed against the Plaintiffs.
The Court has said that Section 41-1-65 in effect nullifies
and wipes out the recording Statutes in the case of an automobile held by a dealer for resale. This is an erroneous conclusion. There is no exception in any of the Sections of the
Statutes above referred to covering an automobile purchased
in a foreign state, and in the Utah case of Swartz vs. White,
80 Utah 150, 13 Pac. (2d) 643, the Court did not indicate any
exceptions when it used the following language at Page 646:
" ... Until the secretary of state shall have issued
such new certificate of registration and certificate of
ownership, as herein provided in subdivision (d),
delivay of such vehicle shall be deemed not to have
been made and title thereto shall be deemed not to
have passed and said intended transfer shall be deemed
to be incomplete and not to be valid or effective for
any purpose. The words of the statute, italicized by us,
are clear and unambiguous and undoubtedly mecm
what they say. Any claimed transfer from Mrs. White
to Stewart was incomplete. Title had not passed and
the transfer was not valid or effective for any purpose.
Briedwell v. Henderson, 99 Or. 506, 195 P. 575; Parke
v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, 228 P. 435." (Italics added.)
13
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In none of the cases cited by the Court or Appellant,
have the Courts been called upon to decide the cases in light
of a Statute, the same as Section 41-1-72 of the Utah Statutes.
In fact this Statute seems to be peculiar to the State of Utah.
In light of the effect the Court gives to Section 41-1-65,
the Petitioner would like to consider that section of the Statute
at this time. This section of the Statute provides that the dealer
purchasing an automobile for resale may hold the Title under
the following conditions, holds the same for resale, and displays thereon the Registration Plates issued for such t/ehicle,
or does not drive or permit it to be driven upon the highway.
The only one of the above conditions present in these cases
was that the automobiles were held for resale, the other
requirements were not present.
The Statute further provides that "but such transferee
upon transfering his title or interest to another person shall
execute and acknowledge an assignment and warranty of title
upon the Certificate of Title and deliver the same and the
Certificate of Registration to the person to whom such transfer
is made," none of which was done in th cases before the Court,
and the buyer did not ask for or in any way inquire about
registration certificate or title certificate.
This section does not exempt the automobile sold by a
dealer from registration, in fact it specifically provides for
registration.
It is submitted, therefore, that the mere fact an automobile
is purchased by a dealer for resale does not bring that transaction outside of the registration Statutes.
14
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The provisions of Section 41-1-72 contains its only exception:
" . . . and said intended transfer shall be deemed
to be incomplete and not valid or ineffective for any
purpose except as provided in Section 41-1-77."
Thus the transfer of an automobile through a dealer is
incomplete and not valid or effective for any purpose until a
new Certificate of Registration and certificate of ownership
has been issued, and no person can become a bona fide purchaser for value until that is done.
The Court's attention is also called to the recent case of
Mackie and Williams Food Stores, Inc., vs. the Anchor Casualty
Company, U.S.C.A. 8th Circuit, 216 Fed. (2d) 317. The facts
in this case are briefly as follows: The Mackie and Williams
Food Stores are a Missouri corporation doing business in the
State of Missouri. Mackie, furnishing the money, purchased
at a receiver's sale at Little Rock, Arkansas a large tractor and
semi-trailer. At the time of the sale the Arkansas Certificate
of Title was endorsed in blank and delivered to Mackie and
R. F. Boyd of Joplin, Missouri. The vehicles were moved to
the lot of Patton and Boyd of Joplin, Missouri for sale, Boyd
taking the Certificate of Title with him. No application for a
Missouri Certificate of ownership was made by Mackie. Mackie
and Williams later repaid Mackie the money advanced for
the vehicles and purchased automobile comprehensive insurance on them. The vehicles were destroyed by fire while the
policies were in force. The insurer brought this action for
declaratory judgment praying that it was not liable for the
loss based solely on the theory that because the .Missouri

15
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Statutes relating to transfer of title to motor vehicles were
not complied with, that Mackie and Williams, Inc, had no
insurable interest. Judgment was given to the Casualty Company and it was affirmed on appeal.
The Court in affirming the judgment after discussing the
Statutes at Page 321 held, basing their decision upon and discussing the case of State Exrel. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford,
Conn. vs. Cox, 306, Missouri 537, 268 S.W. 87, the Circuit
Court discussing that case said:
"It is said that the provisions of the Missouri Motor
Vehicle Act were essentially a police regulation of
the highest type, in the enactment of which public
welfare was primarily considered. It was held that the
express terms of the Statute that the vendor attach
his signature to the assignment on the back of the
Certificate of Title could not be dispensed with and
substantial compliance substituted therefor, even to
create insurable interest. There is no escape from the
conclusion that under the laws of Missouri, literal
technical compliance with the requirements of the Statute is mandatory and essential to the passing and acquisiton of an insurable interest."

The Court further at Page 322 said:
"Reverting to the argument made on behalf of
Mackie and Williams that Paragraph 4 of Section
301.210 does not apply because the vehicles were not
registered under the laws of Missouri. It should be clear
from what has been said that even if Paragraph 4 does
not prohibit the sale in Missouri by a Missouri vendor
to a Missouri vendee of a motor vehicde registered in
another state, until and unless the Certificate of ownership shall pass between the parties, Mackie had not
protected his Title to the vehicles to such an extent
16
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that he could make valid conveyance of an insurable
interest thereon to Mackie and Williams." (Italics
added.)
The Court in holding that the Plaintiffs are estopped to
assert their title to the automobiles in question rely on 4 or
5 cases which the Petitioner would like to analyze at this point:
The case of L. B. Motors vs. Pritchard, Illinois case, 2 5
N.E. (2d) 129 cited 1940. On February 2, 1937 one Hunt
purchased an automobile from the Plaintiff, L. B. Motors and
delivered a note due March 2, 193 7 and conditional sales contract in payment of the same. On April 20, 193 7 Hunt sold
the automobile to one, Emma Weiss, who signed a conditional sales contract and promissory note payable in monthly
installments beginning May 20, 1937. On the same day, April
20, 1937, Hunt sold this contract to the Defendant. Thereafter
Emma Weiss, having defaulted in making her payments,
Pritchard took possession of the car. The conditional sales contract executed by Hunt was in default and the Plaintiff demanded the car from Pritchard. This did not occur until
October 20, 193 7.
The Court in deciding the case made the following significant statements in regard to the facts at Page 13·1:
"The note which Hunt executed became due March
* * * Seven weeks after the note came due
Emma Weiss * * * purchased the car * * * and in the
following paragraph the Court says: 'She did obtain
actual possession of the car and used it for months
and it was not until October 20, 193 7 the appellee
knew the appellant had claimed any title or interest
therein. It was on that day long after Emma Weiss had
2, 193 7

17
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defaulted and after appellee had taken possession of
the car that appellant notified appellee that it held a
certificate of title to he automobile and demanded of
appellee either $420.00 in interest or the automobile."
And the Court at Page 131 says:
"The Motor Vehicle Law and the Uniform Motor
Vehicle Anti-theft Act both provide penalties for those
persons who do not comply with the provisions thereof.
These acts in our opinion were not intended as recording statutes and do not in any way alter, modify or
change the effects of the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act as construced by our Courts and have no
application to the facts disclosed by this record."
And in commenting on this the same Court in the case of
Pageamas vs. Mixon Motor Co., 101 N.E. (2d) 1280 at Page
281 says:
"It is settled law in this State that the cited Statute
is not a recording Statute and does not affect the validity
of the sale of a motor vehicle which is otherwise valid."
Now Illinois apparently has no provision in their Statutes or
did not have any provision in their Statutes similar to Section
41-1-72 of the Utah Code nor a section similar to Section
41-3-2 of the Utah Code.

Besides the lapse of time and the permitting of the car
to be in the possession of the dealer for a period of several
months indicating negligence on the part of the Appellant in
that case, none of which facts were present in the cases before
the Court, and the Illinois Court had no Statute to compare
with Utah Statutes.
18
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In the case of Garrett vs. Hunter, cited by the Court, 48
Southern (2) Section 871, Mississippi case, the Court held in
that case that the question involved was decided in an early
Mississippi case, Columbus Buggy Co. vs. Turley, 19 Southern
232.
· The Turley case involved the sale of buggies by the Columbus Buggy Co. to one, J. M. Smitha, a livery stable keeper in
Natchez, Mississippi for which he paid part cash and gave his
note for the balance. By the terms of the Contract, Smitha
agreed to hold said goods and the proceeds of such as were
sold as agent for the Columbus Buggy Co. and in trust for the
benefit of an subject to the order of the Columbus Buggy Co.
The Court in the opinion at Page 233 says:
"In the case before us, the vehicles were presumed
to be sold to Smitha for resale. The course of business
and comon observation would perhaps raise the presumption but no resort need be necessarily had to
presumption the seller has in its contract expressly
authorized the buyer to resell."
The Court in conclusion says at Page 234:
"Many States have of late years enacted Statutes
requiring the recordation of Contracts in which Title is
retained in the vendor, and many adjudications may be
found under such Statutes, but the cases cited by us were
decided independent of Statutes as it appears before
the enactment of Statutes."
The Mississippi Statutes regarding automobiles are greatly
different from Utah. Mississippi has no special provisions with
respect to Chattel Mortgages, Conditional Sales Contracts or
the like on motor vehicles. The only provision of that State
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is that a vehicle must be licensed annually and required to
have a number plate displayed from the rear only. It has no
provisions for Certificates of Title. The case of Garrett vs.
Hunter is in effect then a horse and buggy case decided in
a State with no recording or registration Statutes governing the
transfer of title or sale of automobiles, and in no wise can be
persuasive in the case at bar.
Another case cited by the Court for its holding is AI' s
Auto Sales vs. Moskowitz, Oklahoma 1950, 24 Pac. (2d) 588.
The facts in that case are somewhat similar to the facts of
the case at bar. The Plaintiffs purchased a Plymouth and the
following day sold it to one, Charles E. Cross, a used car
dealer of Tulsa, Oklahoma. On December 18th Cross signed
a check or draft payable to the Plaintiffs drawn on a Tulsa
bank in full payment. A Certificate of Title was attached to
the draft which was dishonored on presentment, and on December 23rd or 24th, the Defendant purchased a car from
Cross paying for the same, and a bill of sale was given to Moskowitz signed by both parties. The Oklahoma case is decided
by the Court as set out on Page 591 on the following basis:
"Plaintiffs under the facts in this case cannot recover
by reason of the Certificate of Title. Such Certificate
of Title to an automobile issued under a Motor Vehicle
Code is not a muniment of title which establishes ownership, but is merely intended to protect the public
against theft and so forth."
Again we call the Court's attention to the fact that
Oklahoma does not have any Statutes similar or equivalent
to Section 41-3-2 of Utah or Section 41-1-72 of Utah. That
case, therefore, cannot be relied upon as supporting the propo20
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sition that the Plaintiffs in these cases are estopped to assert
their rights to the Buick and Pontiac automobiles.
Another case relied upon by the Court is the case of
Beck vs. New Bradford Acceptance Corp., reported 3 At.
(2d) 55, a Rhode Island case 1938. In that case the Plaintiff
brought the car from one Rickertson, a dealer on July 30,
1935, which had been purchased from a distributor on the
same day. The dealer gave a purchase money note and \Vas
given the right to use the car "for storage and for display
purposes only." The Defendant, a Finance Company, purchased the Contract from the distributor. Both Defendant
and Distributor had noticed at the time of the sale to the
dealer that he was buying the car for resale. On May 2, 19::.·6,
Rickertson defaulted on his note and soon thereafter the
Defendant found the car in the possession of the Plaintiff and
took possession. The Plaintiff brought the action to recover.
In that case there was no discussion as to registration Statutes.
As a matter of fact, Rhode Island does not have any registration
Statutes or Certificates of Title provisions. They require registration for plates only, and they require no formalities to
effect the transfer of title of an automobile, and as stated
in the facts by the Court "they knew the car was being bought
for resale." It is submitted, therefore, that this case cannot be
relied upon to support the position that the Plaintiffs in the
case before the Court are estopped to assert their rights to
their automobiles.
And finally the Court cites as authority for their holding
the case of Siegel et ux vs. Bayless et al., California 248 Pac.
(2d) 968. In that case in August, 1950 Plaintiffs, residents
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of Michigan, turned over their 1949 Cadillac to one, Couls to
deliver to California for the purpose of selling it. Couls was
also given the Registration Certificate which bore the genuine
signature of Mr. Siegel on its face. The Title Certificate was
not delivered to Couls. Couls was authorized to sell the car for
$3·,600.00. Any sale at a lower price was to be submitted and
approved by the owner. A used car dealer by the name of Cole
took possession of the car November 1st for the purpose of
displaying it. Cole received an offer of $3100.00 from the Defendant, which offer was communicated to Siegel, who advised
him that the offer was satisfactory. Cole sold the automobile
for $2785.00 and absconded. The Plaintiff brought this action
to recover the automobile, and judgment was given for Defendant. The Court in deciding this action at Page 969 says:
" ... The basic question is whether Cole was a factor
in this transaction. It clearly appears from the evidence
and findings that he was.
( 1) Section 2026, Civil Code, defines a factor as "an
agent who, in the pursuit of an independent calling, is
employed by another to sell property for him, and is
vested by the latter with the possession or control of
the property, * * * ." There can be no doubt Cole
was employed as an agent by plaintiffs to sell their
Cadillac. He was engaged in an independent business.
Possession of the car was delivered to him. Thus _he
meets all the requirements of a factor. As such he had
"ostensible authority to deal with the property of his
principal as his own, in transactions with persons not
having notice of the actual ownership." Civil Code,
sec. 2 369. Here the court has determined the purchasers
of the automobile "had no notice of any claim of ownership of plaintiffs." Under these circumstances Cole
had authority, so far as defendants were concerned,
22
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to deal with the automobile as his own, for although the
authority of a factor is by this section declared to be
"ostensible," it is, "as to persons without notice as
real 'as it is when it is declared to be actual.' " 12 Cal.
Jur., Factors, sec. 7, p. 416."
And also on Page 970 the Court in conclusion held:
.. . . . ( 4, 5) Finally, in support of the judgment it
should be pointed out that the conduct of plaintiffs in
turning the car over to Cole through their agent Couls,
and in permitting it to be and remain on Cole's used
car lot and actually authorizing him to sell the automobile on their behalf justifies an inference of negligence on their part. The Court determined the defendants were not guilty of negligence in purchasing the
car from Cole. This situation makes applicable the
maxim that "Where one of two innocent persons must
suffer by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it
happened, must be the sufferer." Civ. Code, sec. 3543.
The loss here must therefore fall upon the plaintiffs.
The judgment is affirmed."
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court erred in concluding that the Plaintiffs in this action were estopped to
assert their right to the title of and right to the possession
of the Buick and Pontiac automobiles in question here, for
the reasons that under the law of estopple the elements necessary to make that out are not present; and second, that the
Plaintiffs had a right to rely upon the Statutes of Utah which,
if complied with, would have prohibited Bruce from selling to
the buyers, the Defendants. The Plaintiffs thus having the
right to rely upon these Statutes and their compliance therewith,
they certainly didn't knowingly or with intent, place themselves
in a position to be estopped to later assert their interests in

and to the automobiles in question.
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POINT III
BRUCE, THE LICENSED USED CAR DEALER OF
UTAH, HAD INDECIA OF TITLE OF THE AUTOMOBILES INVOLVED.
The Court in its opinion at Page 2 of the mimeographed
copy says:
"Although Plaintiffs gave to Bruce no written indecia
of title, nevertheless, whereas here Plaintiffs as experienced wholesale used car distributors willingly
turned the automobiles over to Bruce, knowing he was
a licensed used car retail dealer, and would take the
automobiles directly to his place of business in Salt
Lake City for the purpose of resale, and there place
them with the other stock, is in our opinion the granting
of more than mere possession. Such conduct on the
part of the original sellers, Plaintiffs we believe clothed
Bruce with an apparent ownership or authority to sell
said cars in the ordinary course of business . . . ''
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By this statement the Court has found that there was no
indecia of ownership in Bruce other than being given possession by an experienced used car distributor knowing he would
place the automobile on his lot with other stock for the purpose of resale.
The Court by this statement has overlooked or ignored
the entire Stipulation as to the facts as set out in the record.
The Court has said that the Plaintiffs knowingly turned
over the automobiles to Bruce knowing he would take them
to Salt Lake City and knowing he was a used car dealer and
would place them with other stock fot' resale. These are not
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the exact words used by the Court, but they are the fair purport of their meaning. (Italics added.)
The actual facts according to the Stipulation, Record of
Appeal (R. 5-7) and as set out in the Brief of Respondents
in Case No. 8228, are in effect considerably different.
The conclusion of the Stipulation reads as follows:
" . . . and said Drafts were to be honored before
the said automobiles were oIf ered for resale by the
said M. R. Bruce." (Italics added.)
How can it be said that the Plaintiffs knew Bruce would
do what he did in view of the Stipulation of Facts that he
would not do what he did?
The only part of the Statement of the Court that stands
in view of the Stipulation is that the Plaintiffs were experienced
wholesale used car distributors and that they knew that Bruce
was a licensed used car dealer and would take the automobiles
to Salt Lake City.
The question then arises should a different rule of law
be applied in these cases to wholesale used car distributors
than to other persons or organizations, and should wholesale
used car distributors be held to a higher or different degree of
care than any other persons?
The answer is no. Rules of law are laid down to apply
to all persons equally, and the mere fact that Plaintiffs were
wholesale distributors of used automobiles does not necessarily
give them any more knowledge of what Bruce would do
under the circumstances than any other person would have
known or be assumed to have known, assuming that they
25
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knew Bruce was a used car dealer. It follows, therefore, that
under the rule of law laid down by the Court under the present opinion that any person who leaves his automobile with
a used, or new, retail automobile dealer for any reason whatsoever, to have greased, repaired, appraised or for a dozen
or one reasons, he would be estopped to claim his automobile
from a so-called "innocent purchaser of the automobile from
the dealer with whom the automobile had been left because
under the Court's holding they knowingly left it with a licensed used car retail dealer.
This is the logical conclusion to be reached from the
Court's decision, and such a result would in effect wipe out
the registration and licensing Statutes in a potentially large
number of cases. To permit this decision to stand means
that a pandora box of trouble would have been opened. This,
the Respondents are sure, the Court has no intention and had
no intention of doing.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the Petition
for Rehearing should be granted and the Court should reconsider the opinoin heretofore rendered in said case on the
grounds and for the reasons: ( 1) That no estoppel as to the
Plaintiffs has been made out under the facts and law as
applicable in this case. The Court's opinion in effect puts
estoppel as a bar to Plaintiffs' action by imputing by inference
knowledge and actions of the Plaintiffs which have no sup·
port in fact. ( 2) That the Plaintiffs or original sellers acted
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as careful and prudent individuals; that they complied with
all Statutes involved; that they conducted these sales in the
course or in the manner in accordance with the custom of the
sale of used automobiles, and they did everything that they
knew could be done to preserve their interest. They, therefore, acted as careful prudent individuals. On the contrary,
the Defendants made no inquiries of title, did nothing to
determine whether any title was available in the hands of
Bruce or not; they blindly proceeded into a course of conduct
that showed in the least a complete thoughtlessness and disregard for the consequences, and to hold that the Plaintiffs
are estopped would in effect be punishing the prudent and
rewarding the careless individual, and ( 3) This Petition should
be granted for the reason that to permit the same to stand
would open the door to untold cases of fraud by weakening
the effect of the recording Statutes of Utah and enabling
persons by various means to perpetrate frauds upon the public
by being able to circumvent the Registration Statutes. We,
therefore, humbly petition the Court for a rehearing of the
cases involved and for modification of the decision heretofore
rendered.
Respectfully submitted,
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON
Attorneys for Respondents
and Petitioners
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